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Fostering Gender Equality as a Means 
to Counter Radical Religious Islamic 
Movements
Stephane Wolfgeher
The U.S. has implemented various strategies in countries where 
radical religious threats abound and yet still continues to fight the 
same threats. Studies indicate states with higher levels of gender 
equality engage in less severe or lower levels of inter- and intrastate 
violence. This suggests that fostering gender equality may be a viable 
long-term alternative strategy to target the societal acceptance of 
these threats.
Recent conflicts have not been characterized as mass against mass or state vs. state, but as states against terrorist, insurgent, or radical religious groups. The United States has attempted to combat these 
adversaries through the elimination of specific threats and the establishment 
of democratic governments in states where these groups operate. Today the 
U.S. is still fighting against the same threats. It is unlikely that one golden 
strategy exists that will defeat or diffuse all these threats and, therefore, 
there are additional strategies that may be pursued to reduce support for 
these groups in the countries where they are present. It is under the guise of 
alternative methods that this essay argues for support for improved gender 
equality, especially in the realm of personal status codes (family law), educa-
tion, and political involvement to foster an environment that is less tolerant 
of specifically radical religious groups.
Major Stephane Wolfgeher is a U.S. Air Force Aviation officer. She submitted 
this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, Califor-
nia), where she received her M.S. in Information Operations. She is currently 
assigned to the 61st Fighter Squadron, Luke AFB, Arizona. 
40
2010 Special Operations Essays
Why Islamic States?
The World Economic Forum Gender Gap report assigns a grade to all coun-
tries meeting minimum measurable requirements.1 This grade is a compila-
tion of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, 
health and survival, and political empowerment. Of countries that are a part 
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and that meet minimum 
measurable requirements (of which there are 35), only five countries are 
in the top 50 percent. Twenty-two countries occupy the bottom 28 places. 
Those occupying the bottom spots include Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, and Yemen. 
Radical religious groups are not restricted to Islamic states or the Middle 
East. Gender inequality is also not limited to these areas. However, the 
focus of this essay is on states that have tangible means of implementing 
structural inequality through codes or laws. As the U.S. is actively engaged 
in combating the spread of terrorism by radical extremists, this essay targets 
areas that are often seen as the nexus of these movements. 
Women’s Peace Theory
There are two predominant arguments as to why women are associated with 
peace—the essentialist and the constructivist argument. The essentialist 
argument is based on the idea that “female aversion to violence is inherent in 
the essential nature of women” and the constructivist argument assumes that 
“gender roles and their accompanying attitudes are socially constructed.” 2 
There is, however, a third argument that distances the premise away from 
attributes of women, whether inherent or constructed, and focuses instead on 
the socially constructed attitudes of dominance, violence, and subordination 
in both the domestic and international sphere and which can be expanded to 
include other forms of discrimination, such as ethnic inequality. Structural 
inequality manifests when societal order is based upon “subjugation and 
inequality that is rooted in hierarchy, domination, and the use of force.” 3
The definition of gender equality changes depending on the source—it 
can be equality of opportunity in education, work, and political circles; 
equality under the law; suffrage; or equality of self-determination or choice. 
A United Nations (UN) report suggests a culturally neutral definition of 
gender equality: “Gender equality refers to the goal of achieving equal 
rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and boys and 
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girls.” 4 This definition supports the argument for structural equality instead 
of focusing on individual characteristics and attitudes of men or women. 
There is no one measure of gender equality. Rather, various studies have 
used different variables to capture the level of gender equality of states, such 
as the presence of state female leadership, percentage of female parliamentary 
participation, and the ratio of female-to-male higher education attainment; 
parliamentary participation and length of suffrage rights; or percentage of 
women in the workforce and fertility levels (positing that fertility levels are 
a complex measurement of interrelated social, political, and economic status 
of women in society).5 Regardless of which variables were used to measure 
gender equality, the following hypotheses were supported in the studies on 
gender equality and inter- and intrastate violence:
a. States with higher levels of gender equality use lower levels of violence 
during crises, are less likely to use force first in interstate disputes, 
and are associated with lower levels of intrastate armed conflict.6
b. States with higher levels of domestic repression and discrimination 
are more likely to use force first in interstate disputes.7
c. States with higher levels of inequality are more likely to experience 
internal conflict.8
These five studies focused on the state level of analysis and did not pre-
sume that gender equality directly caused reduced levels of violence. Instead 
they postulated a correlation between gender equality and reduced violence, 
with other intervening variables present.9 They argued that measures of 
gender equality supersede those of economic development as statistically 
significant in the levels of internal violence. Specifically, the relationship 
between gender equality and economic advancement is what exerts the 
pacifying influence on inter- and intrastate violence.10 
In the various studies, the following variables were significant in deter-
mining the resultant level of violence: 
a. Economic development, conflict history, and democracy11 
b. Presence and number of at-risk minorities, transitional polities, and 
GDP12 
c. Trigger and democracy score13 
d. Economic growth, allies, democratic homogeneity, and democracy.14 
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The following variables were considered insignificant: ethnic dominance, 
critical mass of women in parliament, and years since regime change; and 
polity type (either autocracy or democracy, but not transitory types).15 As 
stated in one of the studies by Caprioli, “the spread of gender equality is an 
indirect method for reducing the level of violence among states internation-
ally in the long term.” 16
Research at the state level of action seems to support the theory that 
increasing gender equality will ultimately result in less severe or lower levels 
of inter- and intrastate violence. At the individual level, societies whose 
attitudes are more inclined towards gender equality are more supportive of 
nonviolent conflict resolution. Under the UN definition of gender equality, 
the most obvious illustration of structural inequality in Islamic states are 
those related to family law and personal status codes. 
Is Islam the Problem?
As personal status codes and family law are based on shari’a (Islamic law), 
one might wonder if Islam is the source of gender inequality in Islamic 
states. Various authors have made the argument that gender inequality is 
not congruent in Islam and is due to pre-Islamic cultures, geographic tradi-
tions, and historical predominance of patriarchal societies of those regions.
For example, Minault summarizes Sayyid Mumtaz Ali’s quest to rec-
tify gender inequality as early as the late 1890s.17 Sayyid Mumtaz Ali was 
a Deobandi, with an education in Islamic sciences. He studied the Quran, 
Arabic grammar, Persian literature, fiqh (law), and mantiq (logic) and used 
these skills in his argument against gender inequality. He believed that “the 
position of women in Islamic law was theoretically much higher than their 
current status was in fact,” and “keeping women in ignorance and isolation 
is not a requirement of Islam, and to say that it is betrays a lack of under-
standing of religion as well as a fundamental mistrust of women which is 
destructive of family life, of human love, and of all that the Prophet stood for 
in a dynamic, just human society.” 18 His treatise on women’s rights in Islam, 
Huquq un-Niswan, focused on disputing arguments about men’s inherent 
superiority, advocating women’s education, discussing purdah (modest 
behavior) and marriage customs, and clarifying the relations between hus-
band and wife. He used not only Quranic verses to dispute conventional 
wisdom but also logically interpreted the Quran in an attempt to change 
archaic beliefs in response to current conditions. Ultimately, Ali stated that 
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gender equality is promoted in Islam, inequality is maintained by social 
customs (social structuring), and inequality is deleterious to society and 
to human relations. 
Moghadam’s UN background paper specifically targets the manifestation 
of gender inequality via the personal status codes or family law in Arab and 
Middle Eastern societies.19 Often these laws (or the stricter interpretation 
of these laws) were implemented in order to placate Islamist movements, to 
reinvigorate state legitimacy, or as a means to distance a society from western 
influence. Secular feminists in the region have targeted the content of the 
laws as the source of oppression but are adamant that the laws are based on 
patriarchal interpretations of Islam and not true Islam. It is important to 
highlight they are not attacking Islam as a religion and not denying their 
adherence to Islam, but arguing that the laws are inaccurate interpretations 
of Islam; their cultures are sexist, their religion is not.
Mashour, in the discussion over divorce and polygamy in Tunisia and 
Egypt, focused on the idea of shari’a as an evolving concept.20 She stated 
that of the five sources for shari’a, three are human creations, and specifi-
cally that ijtihad is the avenue of progressive (or new) interpretation using 
independent juristic reasoning. Her argument focuses on the fact that 
Quranic texts are traditionally interpreted by men, laws are traditionally 
drafted and enacted by men, and the societies where Islam is present are 
societies that are traditionally (not based on Islam) patriarchal and have 
repressed and marginalized women for centuries. The solution, she postu-
lates, is that to change this mindset, there needs to be movement for feminist 
ijtihad—that women need “to engage in a process of understanding Islamic 
law, its interpretations, and Islamic jurisprudence as well as to articulate 
counter arguments to prove that patriarchal viewpoints are unwarranted 
and inconsistent with Islamic teachings.” 21
Interestingly, many Islamic countries guarantee equal rights in their 
constitutions. Most Islamic states have ratified (with reservations) the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), a UN product.22 Regardless of their constitutions or their ratifi-
cation of international treatises, they still justify inequality based on their 
personal status laws or family codes, which in turn are supposedly rooted 
in Islamic interpretation, but more often are a result of structural inequality 
based on a traditionally patriarchal society.
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What do women in these Islamic countries want? Esposito and Mogahed 
compiled information from Gallup polls and illustrated that “majorities of 
women in virtually every country we surveyed say that women deserve the 
same legal rights as men, to vote without influence from family members, to 
work at any job they are qualified for, and even to serve in the highest levels of 
government.” 23 Women in these coun-
tries want equality; however, they want 
it in a way that is congruent with their 
culture and religion. They want equal-
ity to arise from within, not in reaction 
to pressures from without. The Gallup polls also refute the argument that 
greater religiosity correlates to decreased egalitarian views towards women.24 
This supports the argument that gender inequality in Middle Eastern states 
is more based on societal structure vs. religion.
Case Reviews
Morocco and the struggle over the personal status law (moudawwana) is 
the first case review. Traditionally, in Morocco and in many other Middle 
Eastern countries, the society can be characterized as “hierarchical, patri-
lineal, patriarchal, and class-based, leaving women, children, and the poor 
as their most repressed elements.” 25 Women were secluded and segregated; 
their roles included wife, mother, daughter, but rarely professional; women 
were discriminated against in areas such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
and ownership of property; a woman was considered a minor throughout 
her life; and women were expected to embody morality, obey their husbands, 
and submit. The laws governing the private space for females were in direct 
contradiction to the laws governing the public space, such as the constitu-
tion and international covenants, which guarantee universal standards. The 
feminist movement in Morocco has existed since 1956, but it has not been 
until recently that it has seen significant changes in personal status laws.26 
As early as 1947, the monarchy advocated expanding women’s roles 
through their personal actions, such as educating their own daughters, but 
not in law reform. In the 1990s, women’s movements and leftist political 
parties began pressuring for reforms to the moudawwana. Specifically, they 
wanted equality, majority status at legal age of maturity, rights for a woman to 
contract her own marriage, equalized divorce processes, polygamy outlawed, 
and to make education and work a right, not a concession. The monarchy 
Women in these countries want 
equality; however, they want it 
in a way that is congruent with 
their culture and religion. 
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also joined the push for reforms at this time. There was strong opposition 
from religious circles, which resulted in shelving some efforts until later. 
The King of Morocco has a unique position as the “Leader of the Faith-
ful.” 27 In that capacity, he framed the issue of equality in an Islamic context 
and asserted that 1) the moudawwana was not a sacred text, 2) Islam advocates 
equality and dignity, and 3) the new laws were not flawless and should be 
revised in an ijtihad effort (another association with Islamic interpretation). 
The major reform in 2004 came in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca 
terrorist attacks.28 This important public opinion was decidedly soured against 
Islamists (the major opposition of the moudawwana reform) in response to 
these attacks and forced them to a position of weakness and cooperation 
with the Moroccan monarchy. While the reforms are not perfect, it marks 
a step along the path to gender equality.
Resistance was mainly from religious and conservative groups focused 
on maintaining the status quo. The dissenters argued that changing the 
moudawwana disparaged Islamic law and posed a threat to the Islamic way 
of life. The Moroccan King countered these arguments by couching the 
reforms in religious context, divorced from western influence. There was no 
mention of the inherent right of women, such as detailed in the CEDAW. In 
addition, there was great support from left-wing political groups, women’s 
activist groups, and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).29
In contrast to Morocco is the second case review of Jordan’s lack of 
advancement in personal status laws. Jordan and Morocco have similar 
political structures, majority Muslim populations, similar political relations 
with the U.S. and Israel, secular constitutions that guarantee equal rights, 
and influential Islamist movements that are socially conservative.30 Both 
countries signed on to the UN CEDAW in the early 1990s with reservations 
regarding personal status laws, and both reform movements attempted to 
co-opt Islamists and/or religious conservatives by modifying the proposed 
changes to mollify some concerns. Women’s movements began in earnest 
in the early 1990s (as was the case in Morocco) and the Jordanian monarch 
attempted to reform personal status laws in 1996, 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004. 
Reforms were defeated in the lower house in 2004. 
The differences affecting the eventual outcome were many. Islamists 
eventually cooperated with the Moroccan King, but not with the Jorda-
nian King. Leftist parties in Morocco supported women’s associations and 
human rights activists. Jordan lacked any significant left-wing political 
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groups, and its politics were dominated by groups with tribal affiliations. 
Morocco had more female representation in parliament due to active quotas, 
whereas female representation in Jordanian politics was small and biased 
and populated with women from rural, socially conservative tribes. NGOs 
were restricted in Jordan, resulting in less opposition to Islamist and conser-
vative movements. Finally, Morocco couched their reforms in a culturally 
(and religiously) acceptable indigenous reform movement versus reliance 
on arguments about equality and human rights that were seen as products 
of western thought and institutions. The combination of supposed foreign 
thought and lack of political backing prevented the reform of the Jordanian 
personal status laws.31
Cautions
It is naive to think that implementing change so contrary to established 
customs and beliefs will be embraced by all. It is also naive to think that if 
the structural equality theory is correct, that in an environment of violence 
and oppression, the opposition will allow the change to peaceably occur. In 
Uzbekistan, women were either prosecuted by the communists for failing 
to unveil or killed by family members for unveiling during the 1920 reform 
movements by the Soviets.32 Afghan women have been killed for demanding 
their rights and attempting to change the status quo.33 Afghan girls have 
been assaulted with acid while attempting to go to school.34 Women have 
been verbally attacked and defamed for working outside the home or failing 
to cover themselves.35 Change will not be without resistance.
What can we do?
Studies about gender equality and violence have shown that patriarchal 
societies which foster domestic environments of oppression and dominance, 
measured as gender inequality, act in the same way in inter- and intrastate 
conflicts. 
An avenue exists to combat structural (specifically gender) inequality by 
addressing personal status codes or family law. By addressing these laws, 
one aims to increase female education, participation in government, and 
overall levels of gender equality. While the studies did not propose a direct 
causal relationship between gender equality and less inter- and intrastate 
violence, and while there are multiple other significant variables that may 
also affect a state’s level of violence, increasing gender equality has other 
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positive effects, such as lower infant mortality rates due to better education, 
lower fertility rates, potential economic growth, and basic adherence to 
intrinsic human rights.36
So how does the U.S. go about increasing gender equality in Middle 
Eastern or Islamic societies? One route that has not worked in the past is 
encouraging the change through western prodding, often taken as western 
cultural superiority. Boris Johnson, a British parliamentarian and journalist, 
said “it is time for concerted cultural imperialism. They are wrong about 
women. We are right.” 37 Karen Hughes—in her tour of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
and Egypt—compared the status of Saudi women to the “‘broken wing’ of 
a bird because they lack the right of full participation, including the rights 
to vote and drive.” 38 This type of rhetoric alienates potential allies and fuels 
fundamentalist religious opposition. Changes put forth that hinted of western 
culture or influence often did not succeed. 
In some movements for gender equality reform, there were bastions of 
support from NGOs, home-grown women’s rights groups, and established 
political parties. In others, NGOs were forbidden, independent political parties 
were banned, and women’s rights movements were only active underground. 
This emphasizes that there is not one solution to the problem. One must take 
a look at the society as a whole, the political structure and political freedom, 
the language and history, the laws codifying structural inequality, and the 
potential for social movements. It is important to recognize that not every 
state is the same and that the approach must be tailored to the situation. 
Othman and others suggest multiple supporting avenues to stimulate 
change.39 First and foremost, Islamic feminists must be taught and trained in 
Islam to be able to contest patriarchal interpretations. They must be credible 
to sway both men and women. Groups advocating change must establish 
coalitions; they must cooperate with domestic groups, such as civil society 
and political parties, and with international groups or organizations in 
other countries, such as the Malaysian group, Sisters in Islam (SIS). Actions 
to take include advocacy through memorandums to government officials 
or letters to the editor of public newspapers or magazines; public education 
and awareness; seminars and workshops to discuss gender and law issues; 
public lectures; training on women’s rights for men and women, profes-
sionals, lawyers, and young political leaders; creating resource centers; and 
networking with state actors, NGOs, and other women’s groups (secular, 
traditional, and Islamist). 
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If the U.S. wants to help change the status quo, it has to do it in a cultur-
ally sensitive and respectful way. In reality, it should be done in an indirect 
manner. Zainah Anwar stated “overt support by Western groups is actually 
counterproductive because it undermines the local authenticity of moder-
ate movements in the eyes of the public.” 40 Often, support and praise from 
western groups and governments are “shortsighted and unwelcome.” The 
U.S. already supports some pursuits, such as funding for political educa-
tion, voter education, and leader-
ship training for women in Iraq, 
but could take some lessons from 
Special Operations Forces and find 
a way to work with feminist groups 
by, with, and through, with only a 
local face.41 The U.S. could deploy specially trained groups or individuals 
to work directly with host-nation organizations to support changes with 
resources, knowledge, experience, and connections.
Ultimately, this essay recommends investing in another approach to 
curtail support for radical religious, insurgent, and terrorist groups by 
increasing gender equality. This approach must not be framed as cultural 
superiority, or the West against the Islamic world. It must be tailored to the 
country the U.S. wishes to influence, congruent with their culture, language, 
societal structure, history, political capabilities, laws (and their basis), and 
beliefs. Overt support could jeopardize advancement and the best help the 
U.S. can provide might be using covert or indirect means to train, finance, 
resource, or otherwise support indigenous equality movements. Breaking 
down structural inequality and increasing gender equality may ultimately 
result in a society that does not support attitudes of dominance, violence, 
and subordination in both the domestic and international sphere, resulting 
in less support for domestic insurgent, terrorist, or radical religious violent 
movements. 
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